R&D Insights
Reshoring Is Real This Time, and Puerto Rico Is the Obvious Answer Nobody Says Out Loud
Domestic production has gone from a talking point to a procurement requirement. Puerto Rico sits in a uniquely advantaged position, with some real constraints worth naming.
Reshoring Is Real This Time, and Puerto Rico Is the Obvious Answer Nobody Says Out Loud
Reshoring has been announced roughly every three years since 2010 and mostly did not happen. Executives said supportive things, consultants published decks, and then the spreadsheet said Asia and everyone went back to work.
Something changed, though, and it is worth being specific about what.
The earlier reshoring talk was about cost convergence. The argument was that wages abroad were rising and would eventually make domestic production competitive. That argument was weak, and the market treated it accordingly.
The current pressure is not about cost. It is about availability. A series of disruptions demonstrated that a supply chain optimized purely for price has a failure mode nobody had priced in, which is that you cannot get the thing at all. For pharmaceuticals, medical supplies, semiconductors, and defense components, that failure mode turned out to be politically and commercially unacceptable.
When the driver shifts from cost to availability, the decision logic changes completely. You are no longer looking for the cheapest option. You are looking for the cheapest acceptable option inside a constrained set, and the constraint is domestic.
That is a much smaller set, and Puerto Rico is in it.
Why the island keeps coming up
The reshoring conversation usually stalls at the same place. Everyone agrees production should come back. Then someone runs the numbers on a continental US site and the project dies in committee.
Puerto Rico breaks that stall for a few reasons that compound.
It is domestic. Not nearshore, not friendly jurisdiction, not treaty partner. The United States, with US regulatory oversight, US legal protections, US intellectual property law, US citizens in the workforce, and no customs friction on goods moving to the mainland. Any requirement that says "domestic" is satisfied.
It is already built. This is the part people miss. Puerto Rico is not a greenfield proposition. There is existing pharmaceutical, device, and industrial infrastructure, existing facilities, existing utilities serving industrial users, and critically an existing workforce that has been operating inside multinational quality systems for decades. Reshoring to a place with no industrial history means you are also building a workforce. Here you are hiring one.
It is cost competitive. Construction, operating expense, and labor all sit meaningfully below mainland manufacturing hubs, while remaining inside the US system.
And there is a structured incentives framework, which we will come to.
The thing executives will not say in a press release
There is an awkward dynamic worth acknowledging directly.
Announcing a plant in a mainland state produces political goodwill in that state. Announcing a Puerto Rico expansion does not generate the same kind of domestic political capital, even though it is equally domestic. So some of the reshoring that lands on the island gets communicated quietly, as an expansion of existing operations rather than a reshoring story.
That is a communications reality rather than an economic one, but it explains why the island's role in this trend is systematically undercounted in the coverage. The capital is moving. The narrative is going elsewhere.
Where R&D fits into a reshoring decision
Most reshoring analysis focuses on production cost and ignores where development will live. That is a mistake, because for regulated and technically complex products the development function determines how well the production function performs.
If you reshore manufacturing but leave process development on the mainland or offshore, you have rebuilt the remote-ownership problem that makes sites underperform. The better version is to move the capability, not just the capacity.
Puerto Rico's framework rewards that. The current consolidated statute is Act 60-2019, which replaced the earlier patchwork including Act 73-2008 (Legacy). Under ยง3030.01, research and development activity carries a credit at two fixed rates: 50 percent on direct R&D investment deployed in Puerto Rico into experimental activities, and 20 percent on indirect R&D investment deployed outside Puerto Rico or into incidental activities.
The geographic split is doing real work in that sentence. Development performed on the island sits in the higher category. Development performed elsewhere does not. For a company deciding where to put a process development group as part of a reshoring program, that is a direct input to the model, and it points in the same direction operational logic already points.
Sectors where this is most live
Pharmaceutical and biologics production is the clearest case, given existing capability and the sustained policy interest in domestic drug supply.
Medical devices and diagnostics follow closely, for the same reasons plus an established local supplier base.
Semiconductors and electronics assembly are getting more attention, particularly for packaging, test, and specialized components rather than leading-edge fabrication.
Defense components benefit from the export control position discussed elsewhere on this site, which removes the single biggest obstacle to offshore sourcing.
Advanced materials and specialty chemicals are a quieter but real category, often tied to existing pharmaceutical supply relationships.
The constraints, stated plainly
Nobody is served by a sales pitch, so here are the real issues.
Power reliability is the most cited concern and it is legitimate. Serious projects plan for it explicitly, with on-site generation and redundancy budgeted from the start rather than treated as a contingency. Companies that have done this operate fine. Companies that assumed grid parity with the mainland have had bad surprises.
Logistics require more planning than a continental site. Ocean freight schedules, port operations, and inventory positioning all need to be designed rather than inherited. For high-value, low-volume products this barely registers. For heavy, low-margin goods it matters more.
Talent is deep but not infinite. In specific specialized disciplines, competition for people is real, and compensation has to be competitive rather than discounted simply because the location is.
And incentives come from a decree. General descriptions of the framework are not a substitute for the terms, conditions, and obligations in an actual negotiated document. Anyone who tells you what you will receive before reviewing your facts is guessing.
Everything in this article is indicative advisory context and should be confirmed for your specific situation.
How to evaluate it without wasting six months
The companies that evaluate Puerto Rico well tend to do three things early.
They separate the production decision from the development decision, and evaluate both, because the second one often carries more value than they expected.
They visit. Remote evaluation of this island produces wrong answers in both directions, and a two-day site visit resolves more than a quarter of analysis.
And they model honestly, including power infrastructure and logistics as real line items, rather than running an optimistic case and then being disappointed.
Do that, and the answer is usually clearer than the reputation suggests. Puerto Rico is not a loophole and it is not a hardship posting. It is a US industrial base with a better cost structure and a serious incentives framework, which is exactly the thing the reshoring conversation has been looking for the whole time.